On probability and systematics: possibility, probability, and phylogenetic inference by Haber, Matthew
Syst. Biol. 54(5):831-841, 2005 
Copyright (c) Society of Systematic Biologists 
ISSN: 1063-5157 print /  1076-836X online 
DOI: 10.1080/106351591007444
On Probability and Systematics: Possibility, Probability, and Phylogenetic Inference
M a t t h e w  H . H a b e r
Department of Philosophy, Center for Population Biology, University of California, Davis, 1 Shields Avenue, Davis,
California 95818, USA; E-mail: mhhaber@ucdavis.edu
In phylogenetic systematics, an ongoing debate has 
revolved around the appropriate choice of methodology 
for the construction of phylogenetic trees and inference 
of ancestral states. A recent paper by Mark Siddall and 
Arnold Kluge (Siddall and Kluge, 1997) advocates a priv­
ileged status for parsimony analysis, to the exclusion of 
other, statistically based, phylogenetic methods. Though 
hardly alone in championing this stance (see, for exam­
ple, Kitching et al.'s 1998 textbook Cladistics), narrowly 
focusing on Siddall and Kluge's conceptual arguments 
justifying this position proves insightful. Rather than try 
to address every point made by Siddall and Kluge, I draw 
out two underlying general lines of argument that high­
light assumptions that may lead to misplaced concerns 
and are in need of critical conceptual analysis. The two 
lines of argument that I identify are what I term Siddall 
and Kluge's (i) argument from falsificationism, and (ii) argu­
ment from probability. The first of these has been addressed 
elsewhere both by philosophers and biologists, and will
merely be commented upon below. The argument from 
probability, though, is the primary focus of this article. I 
show that Siddall and Kluge's argument from probabil­
ity is ambiguous, e.g., between metaphysical and epis- 
temic possibility. Upon disambiguation, the argument 
from probability is either invalid, unsound, or simply 
misses the intended target. In working through this dis­
ambiguation, I precisely identify and clarify Siddall and 
Kluge's concerns, and show that sta tistical phylogenetic 
techniques ought not be considered problematic for the 
reasons cited by Siddall and Kluge.
S id d a l l  a n d  K l u g e 's  A r g u m e n t  F r o m  
F a l s if ic a t io n is m
Broadly speaking, Siddall and Kluge have two main 
lines of argument implicit in their paper: (i) the argument 
from falsificationism; and (ii) the argument from probabil­
ity. I will explore Siddall and Kluge's argument from
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probability in more detail in the following section. First, 
though, some brief comments on their argument from 
falsificationism.
Siddall and Kluge's argument from falsificationism 
can be schematized as follows:
Fl The desired scientific methodology is (some kind of) Popperian 
falsificationism.
F2 Parsimony is a phylogenetic method consistent with Popperian 
falsificationism.
F3 Statistical phylogenetic techniques are not consistent with Pop­
perian falsificationism.
F4 Parsimony is the only available phylogenetic technique consis­
tent with Popperian falsificationism.
F5 Therefore, parsimony is the only phylogenetic technique that 
conforms to the desired scientific methodology.
Siddall and Kluge's argument from falsificationism is 
part of an ongoing debate in the systematics literature, 
e.g., the recent exchange in Systematic Biology between 
Kluge and DeQueiroz and Poe (de Queiroz and Poe, 2001; 
Kluge, 2001; de Queiroz and Poe, 2003). Statistical phy- 
logeneticists have tended to argue against Siddall and 
Kluge in one of two ways. The first is to argue that statis­
tical phylogenetic techniques do, in fact, conform with 
Siddall and Kluge's characterization of a falsificationist 
scientific methodology (i.e., to deny premise F3 and F4). 
The other strategy has been to argue that Siddall and 
Kluge are offering a mistaken interpretation of Poppe­
rian falsificationism, which does not qualify as a criterion 
by which statistical methods ought to be judged (i.e., to 
argue that Siddall and Kluge mischaracterize falsifica­
tionism in Fl).
There is a further question of how the falsificationism 
espoused by Siddall and Kluge resembles that which 
has been discussed in the philosophical literature (see 
Farris, 1983; Hull, 1983; Sober, 1988; and Hull, 1999, for 
earlier treatments of cladist characterizations of falsifica­
tionism) There do seem to be at least some important 
differences (e.g., there appears to be some incongru­
ence over the treatment and classification of Fisherian 
statistics; Gillies, 1990; Urbach, 1991; Siddall and Kluge, 
1997), though ultimately I do not think it much matters 
how closely cladistic accounts of falsificationism resem­
ble philosophical accounts of falsificationsim.
Philosophers have also evaluated Popperian falsifica­
tionism (though only a few have done so in the con­
text of systematics (Hull, 1983, 1988, 1999; Sober, 1983, 
2000). Most contemporary philosophers of science are 
critical of the idea that falsificationism is the only accept­
able scientific methodology (Kuhn, 1970,1996; Lakatos, 
1970; Grunbaum, 1976; Kitcher, 1982; Giere, 1988, 1997; 
Salmon, 1998; Sober, 2000). Indeed, some philosophers 
have gone so far as to question whether falsificationism 
is even a very good scientific methodology (Howson and 
Urbach, 1993). The reasons for these objections are many 
and varied, and I will not rehash them here. Suffice to say 
that most philosophers of science would be mildly sur­
prised that very few attempts have been made to deny 
premise Fl of Siddall and Kluge's argument from fal­
sificationism. Though I think this strategy might prove 
fruitful, it is not within the aims of the present paper 
to explore this further. It should be noted that in deny­
ing the sole province of Popperian falsificationism one 
is not denying that testing hypotheses and (possibly) 
proving them false is an important component of scien­
tific examinations. One must not confuse falsificationism 
with any act of falsifying hypotheses; to do so is to get 
caught in what could be dubbed the fallacy of persuasive 
terminology.
S id d a l l  a n d  K l u g e 's  A r g u m e n t  F r o m  P r o b a b il it y
Siddall and Kluge also argue for the privileged sta­
tus of parsimony techniques on the basis of their inter­
pretation of probability. What I term their argument from 
probability runs roughly as follows:
PI Phylogenetic trees are unique historical entities.
P2 Probabilities cannot be assigned to unique historical entities.
P3 Therefore, phylogenetic trees are not the kinds of things to which 
probabilities can be assigned.
P4 Statistical methods assign probabilities to phylogenetic trees.
P5 Therefore, statistical methods that assign probabilities to phylo­
genetic trees are not applicable to the building of phylogenetic 
trees.
In what follows, I examine each of the premises iden­
tified above, and show that each is either ambiguous or 
false. Upon disambiguation, it is evident that the argu­
ment from probability is unsound. As each premise is 
examined, I will offer alternative premises, ultimately 
constructing an alternative argument displaying that 
Siddall and Kluge's concerns are misplaced. My new ar­
gument both (i) precisely identifies and clarifies Siddall 
and Kluge's concerns; and (ii) suggests that parsimony 
analysis and statistical phylogenetic techniques leave 
users in a similar position to make inferential claims con­
cerning phylogenetic relations.
Concerning PI: Phylogenetic Trees Are Unique Historical 
Entities
To fully grasp the weight of Siddall and Kluge's argu­
ment, it is essential to comprehend their notion of actual 
and possible, combined with their acceptance of histori­
cal lineages as individuals (1997:314-315):
There remains considerable confusion in comparative biology 
concerning universals and particulars. A simple question-answer 
exchange between a probabilist and a historian illustrates how easy 
it is to conflate the two.
Probabilist: "What is the chance of life evolving on earth?"
Historian: "Chance? It simply did."
Probabilist: "What is the chance that life has evolved, or could evolve, 
elsewhere in the universe?"
Historian: "None."
Probabilist: "Don't we have a good idea of the physical and chemical 
conditions necessary for life on earth, the number of appropriate 
stars and M-class planets, and, from that, would you not agree that 
we can predict the likelihood of there being life elsewhere?"
2005 POINTS OF VIEW 833
Historian: "Certainly not. Of course the answer might have been yes, 
if I had understood your question to mean a kind of life. Obviously, 
your question is metaphysical, as opposed to scientific."
Notice that the historian in this dialogue is taking 
"life" to mean something like "the historical entity life on 
earth"; but this is a fairly unconventional way to under­
stand the term "life" given the context of this dialogue. I 
have no argument for this beyond an appeal to intuition, 
but consider the following. If someone were to ask you 
whether life exists elsewhere in the universe, it strikes me 
that the context of the term "life" in this question would 
compel you to understand "life" as something like "some 
kind of life" and not, as the historian above, as "life on 
earth." But even if we accept Siddall and Kluge's conven­
tion, it still seems possible that life on earth has evolved, 
or could evolve, elsewhere in the universe. Life on earth 
might have started due to a "seed" from a different part 
of the universe, and we may yet send life to other planets 
where it might continue to evolve. If either of these cases 
turn out to be true, then life on earth is merely a part of 
life in the universe.
There are, however, larger concerns about this dia­
logue that point to confusions in Siddall and Kluge's 
argument. Siddall and Kluge are right to take life on 
earth to be a unique historical entity. But they then want 
to dismiss "chance" as being relevant to the generation 
of life on earth, and claim that discussions of possibility 
of things like historical individuals are discussions of 
metaphysical possibility. How should we understand 
what is meant by "possibility" here, and how does this 
relate to the scientific enterprise? Talk about possibility 
is talk about what is and what is not ruled out. But 
not ruled out by what? By what we know—epistemic 
possibility; by the laws of physics—physical possibility; 
by the laws of biology—biological possibility; and by 
the laws of logic— logical possibility. Underlying the 
above dialogue seems to be a concern over metaphysical 
possibility. Metaphysical possibility is that which is not 
ruled out by necessity; something is metaphysically 
possible just in case it is not necessarily not possible 
(Kripke, 1980; Jubien, 1997).
Most philosophers argue that it is metaphysically pos­
sible that the world could have been different than the 
way it actually is. That is to say, that the way the world 
is is not necessarily the way the world had to be. This 
just means that for it to be metaphysically possible that 
Mendel's work might not have been rediscovered, is just 
to say that it is true that Mendel's work could have been 
lost to history. Notice that this is not true based on what 
we do know of the actual world; so it is not epistemically 
possible.
Notice that Siddall and Kluge are rather dismissive 
of questions of metaphysical possibility. However, for 
them to take a pejorative attitude towards this matter 
appears misguided, because metaphysical possibility is 
rarely a concern to those engaged in scientific research. 
Rather, scientists tend to be faced with actual events about 
which there is incomplete information. When a scientist 
talks about what is possible about that event, we should
typically understand that as a claim about what models 
or hypotheses are (logically) consistent both with what 
we do know of that event and also with other hypothe­
ses to which we are committed. I will call this "scientific 
possibility," to distinguish it from the metaphysical state­
ments described by Siddall and Kluge. So something not 
ruled out by either what we know or the other scientific 
beliefs to which we are committed is a scientific possi­
bility. Philosophers would recognize this as a subset of 
epistemic possibility, and well within the scientific do­
main. Questions of scientific possibility may not simply 
be dismissed as "metaphysical" (in the sense invoked by 
Siddall and Kluge) and, thus, deemed as irrelevant to 
scientific endeavors.
A fair question to ask here is why are Siddall and 
Kluge concerning themselves with matters of possibil­
ity and metaphysics? The answer can be found in what 
immediately precedes their constructed dialogue. What 
worries Siddall and Kluge is that talking about possi­
ble ways a thing might have been shifts the discussion 
from being about particulars (e.g., life on earth) to be­
ing about universals (e.g., the class of things that are liv­
ing). And, as Ghiselin and Hull have shown us, the ob­
jects of study in systematics (i.e., lineages) ought to be 
considered particulars (or, more commonly, individuals) 
(Ghiselin, 1974,1997; Hull, 1976; Baum, 1998). If Siddall 
and Kluge are correct in their worry, then they have a 
strong case to reject appeals to possible phylogenetic 
trees.
But Siddall and Kluge are not correct, for the sim­
ple reason that they make a similar mistake of which 
they accuse their opponents. By conflating metaphysical 
and scientific possibility they fail to properly distinguish 
between claims about the actual historical lineage and 
claims about phylogenetic trees. The term "tree" is am­
biguous. Systematists can use "tree" to mean either true 
tree or phylogenetic tree (among other options). The term 
"true tree" refers to either the actual historical lineage 
of life, or to a segment of that lineage. Which sense of 
"true tree" is being used is usually clear from the con­
text in which it is used, and this is generally not prob­
lematic. (Unless otherwise noted, the term "true tree" 
as I use it should be understood as referring to "some 
actual segment of the historical lineage of life.") System­
atists also talk about phylogenetic trees. "Phylogenetic 
tree" should be understood as a hypothesis or model 
of a particular segment of the actual historical lineage 
of life. So to speak of the true tree is to talk about an 
actual historical entity that is a part of the unique his­
torical lineage of life, whereas to speak of a phyloge­
netic tree is to talk about a hypothesis about the true 
tree.
To see how Siddall and Kluge go wrong, consider their 
following claim (1997:317):
For frequency probability to apply to phylogeny there has to be a
set of simultaneously possible trees, but if only one tree can be "true"
then all others are necessarily false.
Talk of possible trees here is dismissed by appeal to 
the fact that there is only one actual historical lineage.
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Notice, though, that Siddall and Kluge's assertion is itself 
a claim about metaphysical possibility. But this seriously 
misconveys how most biologists would intend such a 
claim. Rather, when biologists speak of “possible trees", 
the claim is not metaphysical, but scientific; i.e., biologists 
are not denying that there is a unique historical lineage, 
rather they are simply claiming that given the state of our 
knowledge, a range of models or hypotheses about the 
actual lineage are consistent with what we know of that 
lineage. So given our epistemic position, discussion of 
possible trees can be understood as a scientific statement, 
not the metaphysical claim characterized by Siddall and 
Kluge.
With regard to scientific possibility, the concern is over 
things like a range of hypotheses about a single event. 
At times, Siddall and Kluge recognize this (1997:313­
314):
No one disputes what the alternative hypotheses are in phyloge­
netics. That is, for N taxa there are exactly (2N — 3)!/NN-2(N-2)! 
possible bifurcating cladograms, all of which are capable of explain­
ing observed character state distributions. These trees, then, com­
prise part of the premise for any phylogenetic analysis irrespective 
of method.
The problem is that the state of the actual event is 
generally not known—indeed, save for special cases 
(e.g., the experimental phylogenies of bacteriophage 
discussed in Hillis et al., 1994), the actual event is in prin­
ciple unobservable and in practice largely unknowable. 
This is not a metaphysical problem. There are a range of 
possible hypotheses or models that describe the event in 
question and are consistent with our beliefs about that 
event. The question for systematists, of course, is how 
to evaluate which of these explanations is best supported 
or justified. When faced with scientific possibility, there 
are many alternative methods available to evaluate the 
competing hypotheses. Falsificationism is one proposed 
scientific method (Popper, 1959a; Kluge, 1997a). With 
regard to systematics, this is manifest (or so it is claimed) 
in parsimony techniques (Kluge, 1997b). There are other 
scientific methods of evaluating competing hypothe­
ses, including statistical methods. Bayesian posterior 
probabilities can be assigned to competing hypotheses, 
providing scientists with an evaluative tool while 
satisfying the axioms of probability. Scientists can also 
evaluate competing hypotheses using likelihood values, 
though these are not, strictly speaking, probabilities of 
hypotheses.
Despite recognition of the problem of scientific possi­
bility, Siddall and Kluge confuse issues by not carefully 
distinguishing between scientific and metaphysical pos­
sibility in systematics (1997:314):
The problem with the verificationist program is that it denies noth­
ing. ... Verificationist approaches to phylogenetics, like maximum 
likelihood, suffer from this failure as well, because all trees are as­
signed a non-zero probability, and yet no more than one tree actually 
can be correct—thus the probabilities are not explanatory.
Except, of course, that not all phylogenetic trees are as­
signed the same nonzero probability. As described here 
by Siddall and Kluge, the phylogenetic tree with the
highest probability might reasonably also be considered 
the best explanation. (This is not to endorse Siddall and 
Kluge's characterization of ML techniques in phyloge­
netics as verificationist. I suppose one could character­
ize ML techniques this way, but to my mind this is un­
necessary, unprofitable, and anachronistic. A preferable 
alternative, for example, would be to describe ML tech­
niques as a model building research program [Giere, 
1997; Griesemer, 2000].) The main problem here, as else­
where, is that Siddall and Kluge fail to distinguish be­
tween the actual historical lineage and phylogenetic 
trees. In the passage above, it is extremely unclear which 
sense of "tree" they are using; indeed, on one reading 
they go from one sense to the other in the same sentence. 
Siddall and Kluge are also confusing probabilities being 
assigned to events or individuals with probabilities being 
assigned to beliefs or hypotheses. This is an important 
distinction which will be discussed in more detail below.
The point of all this is to highlight Siddall and Kluge's 
failure to distinguish between when biologists are speak­
ing of the actual historical lineage and when they are re­
ferring to phylogenetic trees. Although the actual lineage 
is a unique historical entity, phylogenetic trees are not 
historical entities but models or hypotheses of that lin­
eage. Recall premise PI of Siddall and Kluge's argument 
from probability: Phylogenetic trees are unique historical en­
tities. Strictly speaking, PI is false. It fails to capture the 
important distinction described above. I suggest the fol­
lowing premises as a way to begin constructing a new, al­
ternative argument that will capture Siddall and Kluge's 
worries yet adequately recognize important distinctions:
Pla The actual historical lineage of life is a unique historical entity 
which is unobservable and, in practice, unknowable.
P lb  Phylogenetic trees are hypotheses about the structure of the true 
tree.
Concerning P2: Probabilities Cannot Be Assigned 
to Unique Historical Entities
Siddall and Kluge purport to be concerned with a fre- 
quentist interpretation of probability. In particular, with 
whether frequentist interpretations of probability can be 
assigned to historical entities. Rather than historical en­
tities, I am going to discuss singular events. This is a 
broader category, but includes historical entities. So the 
question becomes whether a frequency probability can 
be assigned to a singular event. Siddall and Kluge are 
right that frequentists typically decline to assign a prob­
ability to a singular event. (In fact, this is a rather con­
troversial claim, but for present purpose we can accept 
it without argument.) However, there are other interpre­
tations of probability available that do allow for such an 
assignment. To see why this is so it is instructive to briefly 
review these different interpretations of probability, and 
how each treats singular events.
Before proceeding, a useful distinction needs to be 
made. Similar to the distinction made above between 
metaphysical and scientific possibility, so too is there 
a distinction between objective (or metaphysical) and
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subjective (or epistemic) interpretations of probability. 
Objective interpretations of probability are those that 
take probability to be a thing of the world that exists inde­
pendent of us. Subjective interpretations of probability, 
on the other hand, take probabilities to be reflections of 
degrees of belief about a proposition of some event or ob­
ject of the world. So subjective probabilities, then, do not 
exist in the world independently of our beliefs. A brief 
example can help draw out the importance of making 
this distinction.
Suppose, for example, that I had a coin that was known 
to be biased, though the direction of that bias was un­
known. Suppose, too, that I asked both an objective and 
a subjective probabilist what the probability was that the 
coin would land "heads" upon flipping. The objective 
probabilist might respond with something like "if by 
'probability' you mean objective probability, then all I 
can say of the biased coin is that the probability of that 
coin landing heads is not 50%. The actual objective proba­
bility of the coin landing heads is something that we can 
discover upon experiment and observation; but, given 
that the coin is biased, we know the probability cannot 
be 50%." The subjective probabilist, on the other hand, 
might respond to the same question as follows, "if by 
'probability' you mean subjective probability, I have no 
reason for believing that the coin is biased either towards 
heads or tails, so the only justified degree of belief is that 
it is equally likely to be biased in either direction, and, 
thus, I can contingently assign a 50% probability to the 
proposition that the coin will land heads. Upon experi­
ment and observation, we will be justified in adjusting 
our degree of belief accordingly." So if one is not careful 
to be precise about what kind of interpretation of prob­
ability is being discussed, there is great danger of mis- 
characterizing assignments of probability and confusing 
the issues at hand. In the example just given, both parties 
were right to gently chastise my ambiguous phrasing of 
the question, as the divergent answers given turned on 
which classification of probability was being assumed.
Siddall and Kluge are most concerned about the use 
of frequentist interpretations in phylogenetics (1997:332, 
emphasis added):
Take, for example, the gambler's fallacy: Roberto Alomar is batting 
0.300. He comes to bat three times in a game and fails to get a hit. 
... Our objective probabilist [a frequentist], like the likelihoodist, 
... asserts that, because he is batting 0.300, he still has only a 30% 
chance of getting a hit, but this too fails to take into account the full 
scope of knowledge. In the first place, because Alomar failed to get 
a hit in his last three times at bat, he is actually batting 0.297; the 
probabilities have changed, because they are historically contingent 
phenomena. More to the point, Alomar either will or he will not get a hit 
and there is no probability that can be assigned to that one event: betting 
on one event alone is foolish.
This example will prove useful. We can consider how 
a baseball player's batting average (i.e., hits per at-bat) 
ought to be considered with regard to getting-a-hit in a 
particular at-bat under different interpretations of proba­
bility. This will help reveal some of the subtleties glossed 
over in the preceding Siddall and Kluge discussion of 
Roberto Alomar. The different interpretations that I will
consider are the frequency, propensity and Bayesian in­
terpretations of probability.
Frequency interpretation of probability.—The frequency 
interpretation of probability defines probabilities as the 
long-run relative frequency of an event m occurring in 
a sequence of n cases where n is very large (or infinite) 
(Popper, 1959b). Whether the sequence is extremely long 
or infinite, or actually or potentially existing, is character­
istic of different versions of the frequency interpretation 
of probability. Though these are important distinctions, 
for the purpose at hand they can be ignored, and I will 
typically speak of these sequences as though they need 
only be very large.
Frequency probabilities can be discovered by observ­
ing the relative frequency of an event occurring in an 
observed number of cases, and then idealizing from this 
relative frequency to a long-run (or limiting) relative fre­
quency. Frequentist interpretations of probability are ob­
jective, i.e., they assert that probability is a thing in the 
world independent of our beliefs; probabilities are prop­
erties of things in the world. Most relevantly, a frequency 
probability simply is the relative frequency of an event 
in the long-run or infinite sequence of cases.
As Siddall and Kluge point out, any particular at- 
bat is a singular event which is part of the sequence of 
cases in which the event of getting-a-hit either occurs 
or does not occur. A singular event, in itself, does not 
make up a long-run sequence, nor can a long-run rel­
ative frequency be extrapolated from a singular event. 
(Or, alternatively, the only long-run relative frequency 
that could be extrapolated is 1 or 0, which, as Siddall and 
Kluge correctly note, is rather uninformative.) It is for 
this reason that frequency probabilities are not assigned 
to singular cases. So the frequency probability of Alomar 
getting-a-hit simply is the relative long-run frequency of 
that event occurring in the appropriate sequence, i.e., the 
probability of getting-a-hit is conditional on a particular 
sequence.
So what would it take to assign a frequency probability 
to something like the actual historical lineage? Just like 
with the event of Alomar getting-a-hit, the probability 
would be conditional on some relevant sequence. There 
are two considerations here. One, as Siddall and Kluge 
point out, is that it is not clear what this relevant sequence 
might be. Secondly, what, exactly, is the probability of? 
Let's look at the second of these first.
One candidate for the probability being sought is the 
probability of the actual historical lineage developing 
given a set of initial conditions. But this can not be right. 
Firstly, it makes a difference whether we are conditional- 
izing on a particular (i.e., actual) set of initial conditions 
or a kind of (i.e., theoretical) initial conditions. If the for­
mer, then the frequency probability is just 1—or, more 
precisely, frequency probability doesn't apply here. This 
is exactly the claim that Siddall and Kluge purport to be 
the source of their concern. But biologists are not asking 
this question. Its triviality is overwhelmed by the lack 
of empirical data and theoretical expertise concerning 
the initial conditions of the actual historical lineage that 
would be demanded of such a claim, aside from the fact
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that the structure of claims about phylogeny simply are 
not of this form. If the latter, then we are asking what the 
frequency probability is of the actual historical lineage 
developing conditional on some theoretical initial con­
ditions. The problem is that we are not in a position to 
answer this question as it is formulated. For one thing, 
we simply do not know with certainty the structure of 
the actual historical lineage—after all, that is just what is 
at stake! Instead, if we were to try to address the specified 
problem, we would have to reconfigure the question as 
to be something like asking the probability of some phy­
logenetic tree given some theoretical initial conditions. 
Notice, though, that now we are talking about the prob­
ability of a hypothetical phylogenetic tree conditional on 
some hypothetical initial conditions—a far cry from as­
signing probabilities to the actual states of affairs.
There are two things to notice here. The first is that 
systematists simply are not trying to determine the prob­
ability of phylogenetic trees given some theoretical ini­
tial conditions. Formulating the probability equation this 
way fails to appropriately incorporate data into the sci­
entific enterprise, and sounds more like philosophy than 
science. When systematists formulate phylogenetic trees, 
they do so based on (i.e., conditional on) observed data— 
the actual character state distributions of taxa. Were it the 
case that the initial conditions could be directly observed 
and serve as data, then perhaps systematists would for­
mulate phylogenetic trees based on these!
The second thing to notice is that even if systema­
tists were assigning frequency probabilities to phyloge­
netic trees conditional on hypothetical initial conditions, 
probabilities are not being assigned to historical entities 
or singular events! Instead, they are being assigned to 
models which display a kind of evolutionary relation­
ship among the taxa of interest. So even if Siddall and 
Kluge are granted much of their argument, their worry 
still seems unfounded or misplaced.
Above I suggested that selecting the appropriate se­
quence on which a frequency probability can be condi- 
tionalized is difficult. This, however, is a problem faced 
by any probability assigned in the frequency interpreta­
tion. Recall that the probability of Alomar getting-a-hit 
is conditional on a particular sequence. But herein lies 
the problem. Each singular at-bat is a member of many 
sequences each of which may have a different relative 
frequency of Alomar getting-a-hit (these sequences are 
generally referred to as reference classes). Consider the dif­
ferent conditions (and resultant sequences) that might be 
considered: Alomar's batting average over the course of 
his career, as a member of the Toronto Blue Jays or New 
York Mets, in a particular baseball park, against left- or 
right-handed pitching, etc. In fact, the actual relative fre­
quency of getting-a-hit in these different reference classes 
or sequences diverges substantially. Which of these ref­
erence classes has the relative frequency of interest and 
relevance?.
How might a frequentist explain the divergence of 
Alomar's batting average in the difference reference 
classes? The frequentist might argue that the different 
reference classes are made up by a very small sample
size of possible cases, and that it is not at all surprising 
for the relative frequency of an event occurring in a small 
subset of a large (or, worse, infinite) sequence to diverge 
widely from the relative frequency of that event in the 
larger sequence.
The frequentist, though, is faced with two challenges. 
On one hand, the various sequences may be too small to 
qualify as a sequence from which a frequency probability 
can be meaningfully derived. The conditions that define 
a small sequence are too confining to generate a mean­
ingful long-run relative frequency. On the other hand 
is a related problem. What relevancy does a frequency 
probability have to any given subset of the long-run se­
quence? if the relative frequency of an event occurring 
in any observable subset might diverge widely from the 
relative frequency of that event in the long run or infinite 
sequence, then on what grounds can we justify asserting 
that a frequency probability has any relevance to any ob­
served sequence? These, and other similar problems, are 
more generally known as reference class problems.
In fact, Karl Popper, among others, recognized the lim­
itations of the frequentist interpretation of probability, 
and proposed revisions to address these problems. Given 
Popper's prominence among systematists, it is worth 
taking a brief look at these revisions.
Propensity interpretation of probability.—Frequency the­
orists are aware of the problems facing frequency inter­
pretations of probability, and have proposed revisions to 
address these problems. One of the first of these mod­
ifications was Popper's propensity theory (Popper, 1957; 
Popper, 1959b). One of the primary motivations driving 
Popper to develop his propensity theory was the desire to 
assign "physically real" probabilities to singular events 
(Popper, 1959b:28):
... the interpretation of the two-slit experiment... ultimately led me 
to the propensity theory: it convinced me that probabilities must be 
"physically real"—that they must be physical propensities, abstract 
relational properties of the physical situation, like Newtonian forces.
... Now these propensities turn out to be propensities to realise singular 
events. It is this fact which led me to reconsider the status of singular 
events within the frequency interpretation of probability.
So the propensity theory of probability, like the frequen­
tist interpretation, is an objective theory.
Rather than identify probability with the long-run rel­
ative frequency of an event, propensity theory identifies 
probability as the propensity of an event to occur under 
specified conditions (Popper, 1959b:34):
The frequency interpretation always takes probability as relative to 
a sequence which is assumed to be given; and it works on the as­
sumption that a probability is a property of some given sequence. But 
with our modifications, the sequence in its turn is defined by its set 
of generating conditions; and in such a way that probability may now 
be said to be a property of the generating conditions.
Popper recognized the radical implication of this 
with regard to assigning probability to a singular event 
(Popper, 1959b:34) (reading "a probability p(a\b)” as "a 
probability p of a given b")\
But this makes a great difference, especially to the probability of 
a singular event (or an "occurrence"). For now we can say that the
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singular event a possesses a probability p(a | b) owing to the fact that it 
is an event produced, or selected, in accordance with the generating 
conditions b, rather than owing to the fact that it is a member of a 
sequence b. In this way, a singular event may have a probability even 
though it may occur only once; for its probability is a property of its 
generating conditions.
So we can reconsider Siddall and Kluge's dialogue be­
tween the probabilist and the historian mentioned above. 
If we understand the actual historical lineage as a singu­
lar event, we might then understand the probability of 
the actual character state distributions as a propensity of 
the conditions in which this distribution was produced. 
These conditions are generally described by biologists as 
models of evolution. Again, looking to Popper (1959b):
This modification of the frequency interpretation leads almost in­
evitably to the conjecture that probabilities are dispositional prop­
erties of these conditions—that is to say, propensities. This allows 
us to interpret the probability of a singular event as a property of 
the singular event itself, to be measured by a conjectured potential or 
virtual statistical frequency rather than by an actual one.
Depending upon how committed Siddall and Kluge 
are to Popper's falsificationsim, I wish to suggest that 
Siddall and Kluge err in the strategy of their argument 
from probability. They were correct to begin by criticiz­
ing the assignment of frequency probabilities to singu­
lar events, but go wrong when they suggest there is no 
remedy. Rather, what Siddall and Kluge should have ar­
gued is that the probabilities in ML methods ought to be 
interpreted as propensities. The question, then, would 
be whether propensities are playing an appropriate ex­
planatory role in the formulation of phylogenetic trees. 
This strategy would raise another question: as long as the 
application of probability is consistent with the axioms 
of probability, must biologists also offer a justification 
and explanation of how those probabilities ought to be 
interpreted? It may be that this is a task better left to 
probability theorists.
There are many varieties of propensity theory, and 
some propensity theorists claim that any revision of a 
frequency interpretation that accommodates the refer­
ence class problem ought to be considered some kind 
of propensity theory (Gillies, 2000). Though interpreting 
probabilities in systematics as propensities may prove 
fruitful, as I am not aware of any explicit appeals to 
propensity theory in any phylogenetic techniques, dis­
cussion of propensity theory will have to be truncated in 
favor of moving on.
Subjective interpretations of probability.—Recall Siddall 
and Kluge's appeal to an example from baseball 
(1997:314-315, emphasis added): "More to the point, 
Alomar either will or he will not get a hit and there is 
no probability that can be assigned to that one event: bet­
ting on one event alone is foolish." This is misleading, and 
confuses the issue at hand. After all, whether a bet is fool­
ish or not depends upon the odds one has been offered. It 
may be foolish to make most bets as a patron of a casino, 
but getting ten-to-one odds on a fair coin landing heads 
might be more reasonable. Bayesians extend this princi­
ple to develop a subjective theory of probability (Gillies, 
2000). This is important for at least two reasons. First, it
is evident that people do, in fact, make bets on singu­
lar events all the time (of course, they may be foolish to 
do so). Secondly, Bayesians claim that an examination 
of betting behavior demonstrates exactly how subjective 
probability makes contact with singular events.
For Bayesians, subjective probability is a reflection 
of the degree of belief a person has in a proposition, 
and these beliefs can be measured and quantified. Sub­
jective probabilities can be modified by conditionaliz- 
ing upon evidence. This conditionalization process, it 
is claimed, can be approximated by using Bayes, The­
orem: p(h\e) =  (p(e|/i)-p(/z))/p(e). Prior to condition­
alization, subjective probabilities (p(h)) are called prior 
subjective probabilities, with the resultant conditionalized 
beliefs (p(h |e)) called posterior subjective probabilities. One 
feature of Bayesianism is that a posterior subjective prob­
ability becomes the prior subjective probability for the 
next conditionalization event.
So a Bayesian could assign a subjective probability to 
the proposition that Alomar will get a hit in a partic­
ular at-bat. The Bayesian would need to conditionalize 
on as much evidence as was deemed, relevant, e.g., how 
Alomar fares at home, away, with runners on base, in 
the playoffs, etc. The amount of relevant information 
here reflects the complexity and difficulty of assigning 
subjective probabilities to things like Alomar getting-a- 
hit in such-and-such a situation. But this conforms with 
experience. It is notoriously difficult to predict when a 
baseball player will get a hit or not. Tins, of course, is part 
of the appeal of baseball (and the source of many base­
ball debates). The best managers are those who know 
how to recognize which information is relevant and take 
it into consideration appropriately. If it were otherwise, 
baseball would be a much less exciting game—or at least 
much easier to manage.
This also conforms with experience of things like sys­
tematics. The more familiar a scientist is with a system, 
the better able she is to both ascertain which information 
is relevant and then appropriately apply that information 
to particular problems. This, though, is true not only of 
the Bayesian, but also of the frequency and propensity 
theorist. Where the frequentist must identify the rele­
vant sequence, the propensity theorist must identify the 
relevant conditions and the Bayesian identify the rele­
vant evidence upon which to conditionalize. These are 
analogous problems. How much confidence a systema- 
tist will place in a subjective posterior probability, or a 
propensity, or a frequency probability will be relative to 
how much information is available to them. The better 
acquainted one is with a system the more confident one 
will be in the probabilities assigned to particular events 
of that system.
The purpose of this broad overview of interpretations 
of probability was to evaluate premise P2 of Siddall and 
Kluge's argument from probability: Probabilities cannot 
be assigned to unique historical entities. As it stands, P2 is 
not formulated precisely enough to reflect the different 
interpretations of probability available to the scientist. 
By disambiguating P2, we get the second premises of 
my alternative argument (to be fair to Siddall and Kluge,
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note that P2a most closely resembles the thesis offered in 
their paper):
P2a Frequentist probabilities cannot be assigned to singular events. 
P2b Propensities can be assigned to singular events.
P2c Bayesian posterior probabilities can be assigned to descriptions 
of singular events.
Concerning P3: Therefore, Phylogenetic Trees Are Not the 
Kinds of Things to Which Probabilities Can Be Assigned
The conclusion at P3 does not follow from the alterna­
tive premises. Instead we get the following:
P3a Therefore, the actual historical lineage is not the kind of thing 
to which a frequentist probability can be assigned.
This conclusion seems to be consistent with what 
Siddall and Kluge are claiming, especially in light of 
their discussion of probabilist versus historical thinking 
and their characterization of frequency probability (see 
above). The object in question, the true tree, is an historic 
individual, and such things ought not have frequency 
probabilities assigned to them.
However, as previously described, the problem faced 
by systematists is a scientific one. To reflect this, we need 
to insert a new premise, something like:
P3b Phylogenetic trees, as hypotheses of the structure of parts of the 
true tree, are models explaining character state distributions of 
current taxa. Such models are more or less well supported by 
evidence.
P3b, then, formally recognizes the process of evalu­
ating phylogenetic trees as a scientific problem, not, as 
Siddall and Kluge imply, a metaphysical question. Sys­
tematists are working under the assumption that of the 
possible phylogenetic trees, at least one relevantly cap­
tures the structure of the true tree.
Inserting this new premise serves to highlight that 
the central problem faced by systematists is to evaluate 
among the different possible phylogenetic trees. Typ­
ically this is done using parsimony, likelihood, or 
Bayesian cladistic analysis. So now we are in a position 
to evaluate Siddall and Kluge's fourth premise.
Concerning P4: Statistical Methods Assign Probabilities 
to Phylogenetic Trees
Recall that Siddall and Kluge's primary concern was 
that statistical techniques were assigning frequency 
probabilities to the actual historical lineage. In the origi­
nal argument, this concern was located in premise P4. But 
look at what has happened. By carefully distinguishing 
between the actual historical lineage and phylogenetic 
trees, even if we accept premise P4 as it stands Siddall 
and Kluge's worry goes away. That said, premise P4 is 
too blunt; it fails to precisely describe statistical phyloge­
netics. In its place, we need new premises that recognize
the fact that phylogenetic trees (regardless of the method 
by which they were constructed) are hypotheses explain­
ing character state distributions of current taxa. A new 
premise also needs to reflect both (i) that phylogenetic 
techniques evaluate hypotheses and provide justification 
for selecting one hypothesis over others (whether that 
justification is in terms of most corroborated, best sup­
ported, etc.); and (ii) that there are, at present, three ma­
jor techniques found in contemporary systematics (i.e., 
parsimony, ML, and Bayesian analysis). So, without wor­
rying too much about the details, let's look at how each 
phylogenetic technique provides justification for select­
ing one among many possible phylogenetic trees.
Parsimony.—Parsimony is a cladistic technique that se­
lects from among the possible phylogenetic trees that tree 
that requires the least number of evolutionary steps and 
is still consistent with the data (Kitching et al., 1998). As 
described by Siddall and Kluge, the most parsimonious 
phylogenetic tree is said to be the most corroborated tree, 
and, so it is claimed, an inference to the evolutionary re­
lations of the taxa in question is justified on a Popperian 
falsificationist scientific methodology.
One question that may be worth pursuing is whether 
cladists are implicitly appealing to some kind of propen­
sity. For example, a cladist could justify an appeal to par­
simony on the grounds that lineages have a propensity 
to evolve parsimoniously under certain conditions. This 
appeal to propensity, though, would be perfectly consis­
tent with Popperian Falsificationism (indeed, it would 
even be expected). Of course, cladists adamantly deny 
making this particular claim (or any such appeal to a 
specific model of evolution)—wisely, as it would open 
the door for just the kind of probability claims they want 
to exclude.
Maximum likelihood (ML).—Systematists using ML do 
not assign any kind of probabilities to either the true tree 
or to phylogenetic trees. ML assigns a likelihood value 
to phylogenetic trees conditional on the data. The likeli­
hood of a phylogenetic tree conditional on the observed 
data, L(h\e), is equal to the probability of the observed 
data conditional on that phylogenetic tree, p(e| h). (Which 
interpretation of probability is used here may vary with­
out affecting the overall argument.) But the likelihood of 
a phylogenetic tree is not the same statistical measure as 
the probability of that tree; it is merely an alternative sta­
tistical method for evaluating hypotheses (Sober, 2000). 
Simply put, L(h\e) is not necessarily equal to p(/i|e), any 
more than p(h\e) and p(e|h) are necessarily equal. Though 
it might appear that by assigning a probability to actual 
character state distributions ML advocates are guilty of 
just what Siddall and Kluge are concerned about, there 
are two reasons to think this is not true. The first is that 
a probability is being assigned only to observed charac­
ter states, not to the actual character state distributions 
in toto. Small solace, perhaps, but solace nonetheless. 
Popperians, however, ought to take this very seriously. 
Popper accepted that all observational statements are 
theory laden and, thus, themselves fallible, and, as such, 
should be recognized as epistemic and not metaphysical 
claims (Popper, 1989) (see Howson and Urbach, 1993:132
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for more discussion on this point). The other reason 
Siddall and Kluge's concerns are not applicable here is 
that the probability of the observed data is ranging over 
a set of possible character state distributions—just the 
criteria Siddall and Kluge demand for an assignment of 
frequency probability (1997: 317):
For frequency probability to apply to phylogeny there has to be a set
of simultaneously possible trees__
To see why this is so, a deeper look at how likelihoods 
are assigned to trees is needed.
In ML, a model of evolution must be specified. Part of 
the specification of this model includes the probability 
of changing from one character state to another on any 
given branch of a phylogenetic tree (e.g., changing from 
one nucleotide state to another). So, for any phylogenetic 
tree, the probability of any distribution of possible char­
acter states can be determined. This is what is measured 
by p(e| h). Recall also that the actual state of affairs is typ­
ically understood as one among many possible states of 
affairs. To determine the likelihood of a particular phy­
logenetic tree given a particular set of data (actual or 
otherwise) is to ask what the probability of that data set 
is given that phylogenetic tree. The probability ranges 
over a set of possible distributions of data condition- 
alized on phylogenetic trees and a model of evolution 
(Swofford et al., 1996). The phylogenetic tree with the 
highest likelihood value conditional on the actual data is 
then claimed to be the best supported hypothesis of the 
structure of the actual historical lineage, and is called the 
ML phylogenetic tree.
Bayesian phylogenetic analysis.—As the name would im­
ply, Bayesian phylogenetic analysis evaluates the possi­
ble phylogenetic trees using posterior probabilities. The 
range of possible phylogenetic trees makes up the pa­
rameter space over which the posterior probabilities are 
distributed. Bayesian phylogeneticists use Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms to approximate the 
posterior distribution over the parameter space (Larget 
and Simon, 1999; Huelsenbeck et al., 2002). The phylo­
genetic tree (or consensus tree) with the highest poste­
rior probability is then said to be the best supported hy­
pothesis conditional on the data. It is worth noting that 
assigning posterior probability is one thing; ascertain­
ing confidence in those posterior probabilities is another 
thing altogether.
The above descriptions show how the different phy­
logenetic techniques evaluate the possible phylogenetic 
trees and also justify the inferential claims involved in 
selecting among the phylogenetic trees. Premise P4 can 
be replaced with new premises to reflect this:
P4a Cladists use parsimony (in a Popperian falsificationist frame­
work) to justify inferential claims about the structure of the ac­
tual historical lineage.
P4b Statistical phylogeneticists use either (i) likelihood techniques 
utilizing statistical approaches or (ii) Bayesian subjective proba­
bility to justify inferential claims about the structure of the actual 
historical lineage.
Co n clu sio n
Siddall and Kluge's argument from probability fails 
to support their concerns about statistical techniques in 
phylogenetics. To recap, Siddall and Kluge's argument 
from probability runs as follows:
PI Phylogenetic trees are unique historical entities.
P2 Probabilities can not be assigned to unique historical entities.
P3 Therefore, phylogenetic trees are not the kinds of things to which 
probabilities can be assigned.
P4 Statistical methods assign probabilities to phylogenetic trees.
P5 Therefore, statistical methods that assign probabilities to phylo­
genetic trees are not applicable to the building of phylogenetic 
trees.
I have shown that each of these premises is either false 
or ambiguous. In their place, I have recommended the 
following argument:
Pla The actual historical lineage of life is a unique historical entity 
which is unobservable and, in practice, unknowable.
P lb  Phylogenetic trees are hypotheses about the structure of the true 
tree.
P2a Frequentist probabilities can not be assigned to singular events.
P2b Propensities can be assigned to singular events.
P2c Bayesian posterior probabilities can be assigned to descriptions 
of singular events.
P3a Therefore, the actual historical lineage is not the kind of thing 
to which a frequentist probability can be assigned.
P3b Phylogenetic trees, as hypotheses of the structure of parts of 
the true tree, are models explaining character distributions of 
current taxa. Such models are more or less well supported by 
evidence.
P4a Cladists use parsimony (in a Popperian falsificationist frame­
work) to justify inferential claims about the structure of the 
actual historical lineage.
P4b Statistical phylogeneticists use either (i) likelihood techniques 
utilizing statistical approaches or (ii) Bayesian subjective prob­
ability to justify inferential claims about the structure of the 
actual historical lineage.
In the alternative argument, the conclusion that statis­
tical methods are not applicable to the building of phy­
logenetic trees does not follow from the premises. It in­
stead suggests that statistical and cladist methods are, 
at least, on equal footing, and that to claim otherwise 
would require further argumentation. The problems that 
Siddall and Kluge identify with statistical phylogenetics 
go away upon recognition of the important distinctions 
between (i) the actual historical lineage and phylogenetic 
trees, and (ii) scientific and metaphysical possibility. Par­
simony and statistical techniques are competing meth­
ods for approaching the scientific problem of evaluating 
amongst possible phylogenetic trees, i.e., hypotheses of 
the true tree. It bears mention, too, that parsimony need 
not be formulated in a Popperian Falsificationist frame­
work, but might be developed as a likelihood technique 
(Sober, 2004). In such cases parsimony would fall un­
der the rubric of a likelihood technique utilizing statisti­
cal methods, and would count as a competing statistical 
phylogenetic technique. None of these methods, how­
ever, are inappropriately applying probabilistic thinking 
to phylogenetic problems.
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A final point is worth noting. I have downplayed 
the potential conflicts within statistical phylogenetics 
(Lewis and Swofford, 2001). The recent introduction and 
development of Bayesian phylogenetic techniques may 
present challenges to ML advocates. How the adop­
tion of these Bayesian techniques plays out in theoreti­
cal systematics bears watching. For example, how much 
confidence should systematists place on high posterior 
probabilities? How should confidence be quantified? 
How do posterior probabilities (and their confidence lev­
els) compare to likelihood and bootstrap values? Are 
Bayesian phylogenetic techniques necessarily incorpo­
rating subjective probability? I anticipate that debates 
and dialogues surrounding these and other issues will 
grow more central as Bayesian techniques are more 
widely adopted, possibly supplanting the debate be­
tween cladists and statistical phylogeneticists. My hope 
is that these discussions will proceed without the acri­
mony that has unfortunately characterized past debates 
in systematics.
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